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Aristotle vs Theognis
George Couvalis
Arstotle argues that provded we have moderate luck, we can attan eudamona 
through our own effort. He clams that t s crucal to attanng eudamona that we 
am at an overall target n our lves to whch all our actons are drected. He also clams 
that the proper target of a eudamon human lfe s vrtuous actvty, whch s a result 
of effort not chance. He crtcses Theogns for sayng that the most pleasant thng s 
to chance on love, argung nstead that vrtuous actvty s the most pleasant thng. I 
argue that although Arstotle’s vew s nsghtful and carefully worked out, he fals to 
show that Theogns s wrong. Effort s not necessarly the path to human eudamona 
and mportant thngs we attan by chance seem to have an rreplacable value.
Introduction
Arstotle argues that we can through our own effort attan a eudamon lfe, a lfe we 
would have f we were watched over by a bengn sprt, provded we have some mod-
erate luck and some external goods. He thnks hs vew s threatened by a remark 
he takes to be so mportant that he quotes t near the start of book 1 of Eudeman 
Ethcs. The remark, whch the ancents attrbuted to the poet Theogns, s that “the 
most just s finest (kallston), best (loston) s health; but most pleasant (hedston) 
s to chance on what we love (ts era to tuchen)” (EE 1214a:5–6). (The Greek word 
“tuche” means both chance and luck.) Arstotle prefaces hs subsequent comments 
by declarng that “we wll not agree wth hm [Theogns], for eudamona s at once 
the finest and the most mportant (arston) of all thngs — t s also the most pleas-
ant” (EE 1214a:6–7). (Before quotng the same remark at Ncomachean Ethcs [NE] 
1099a:27–8 he comments that these qualtes are not separate [ou dorsta].)1
1 I follow the usual conventon n referrng to passages n Arstotle, whch s to refer to the page num-
bers and column letters of the standard edton of the works of Arstotle, edted by Bekker. These page 
numbers and column letters are repeated n all modern edtons of Arstotle’s works.
The relatonshp of the Eudeman and Ncomachean Ethcs s a matter of much debate. Some of 
the books now n the Ncomachean Ethcs may have orgnally belonged n the Eudeman Ethcs. The 
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Arstotle tells us that the remark was nscrbed on the gateway to the temple of 
Leto on the sland of Delos — an sland sacred to the wse god Apollo. So presum-
ably people thought t was profound and ths s why Arstotle wants to rebut t. He 
understands the remark to be sayng that the good (agathon), the fine (kalon) and the 
pleasant (hede) are not all aspects of the same thng. Hs crtcsm elsewhere of the 
dea that chance (or luck) plays a sgnficant role n the best lfe suggests that he also 
takes Theogns to be sayng both that chance rather than our own effort s crucal n 
whether we have a successful lfe and that what s attaned by chance s as worthwhle 
as what we attan through our own effort. 
To understand Arstotle’s clam, t s mportant to stress that eudamona here does 
not mean happness n the ordnary sense, because that can be transtory and consst 
of dsconnected segments of pleasure. He takes t that eudamona means somethng 
lke success n lfe. A eudamon lfe s not only pleasant, t lacks no mportant human 
good. In addton, a eudamon lfe s connected by an overall structure whch makes 
t one thng and transforms the sgnficance of panful events t contans. 
It s useful to turn to Danel Russell’s recent account of Plato to get a better grasp 
on Arstotle’s vew of how a eudamon lfe s unfied (Russell, 2005). Russell argues 
that Plato has a drectve rather than an accumulatve vew of eudamona — for 
Plato, a eudamon lfe s not a lfe consstng of an accumulaton of pleasant exper-
ences but a lfe focussed on a broadly defined worthy goal whch gves t a struc-
ture and gves experences an overall emotonal sgnficance. Arstotle has a smlar 
drectve concepton. It seems that on hs account even very panful experences can 
acqure a postve character whch depends not on ther ntrnsc features, but on 
ther role n such a lfe. So, for nstance, what would otherwse be merely a panful 
and frghtenng experence can acqure a postve valency f t s part of a process of 
courageous actvty whch s proper part of a vrtuous lfe. Ths means that we can 
enjoy t even though t s not pleasant. Indeed, gven our overall lfe goal, we enjoy t 
n part because t s not pleasant. (Compare the panful experences of an athlete who 
s buldng up to competng n the Olympc games.) Note, however, that Arstotle s 
unwllng to push the drectve concepton as far as Plato — for nstance he s unwll-
ng to say that Pram led a eudamon lfe because he was vrtuous to the end (NE 
1100a:7–10). (Arstotle s here presumably thnkng of the absurd clam that even 
when Pram ended up on the rack at the end of hs lfe, hs cty destroyed, hs sons 
klled, hs wfe sold nto slavery, and hs daughter murdered for beng the sex slave of 
Agammemnon, he attaned eudamona because he was vrtuous to the end.)
Arstotle’s commtment to the drectve concepton of eudamona may explan 
why, shortly after hs very bref dscusson of Theogns, he takes hmself to have 
already lad down that “... everybody who has the power (dunams) to lve accord-
ng to hs own choce should set hmself a target (skopon) for a fine lfe, whether t 
Eudeman Ethcs may have have been wrtten before the Ncomachean Ethcs. For the purposes of ths 
paper I wll treat both as puttng forward a unfied vew.
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be honour or glory or wealth or 
cultvaton (padean), on whch 
he wll be focussng (pros t apo-
blepon) n makng (poseta) all 
hs actons (praxes) — for t s 
a mark of much folly (aphrone-
ss pollus) to have not organsed 
one’s lfe by drectng t towards 
an end (telos)...” (1214b:7–13). 
In understandng ths clam, we 
should note that although Ar-
stotle talks as f the eudamon lfe 
s the lfe of a monomanac, he 
ndcates elsewhere that he means 
that a eudamon human lfe must 
nclude attenton to other people 
such as parents, chldren, a wfe 
and fellow ctzens. Humans are 
socal anmals (1097b:8–12). 
It s dfficult to know what pre-
csely Theogns meant or what 
precsely Arstotle s rejectng. In 
what follows, I wll nterpret The-
ogns to be makng what I thnk 
to be a profound clam whch I wll nterpret Arstotle to be rejectng. I wll argue 
that despte Arstotle’s valuable nsghts, he fals to deal adequately wth the problems 
rased by Theogns. 
Arstotle mght be taken to understand Theogns’s background reasonng to be 
ths: people who are devoted to justce are hghly admrable. However, n pursut of 
justce, they end up wth few resources and put themselves under great stran and nto 
danger. Health s a great good, but people who are partcularly healthy are healthy 
because they are self-nterested ndvduals who are nggardly wth ther resources 
and do not worry much about njustces — they thus fal to be admrable. People who 
seek to lve very exctng lves take great chances — they are not careful to protect 
ther health and are not admrably just. Nevertheless, through ther chancy lfe, they 
sometmes ht on what they love most. When they ht on t they are most pleased not 
only because of what they have attaned but because of the thrll of havng chanced 
on t. Human lfe s tragc and a lfe n whch one attans all the worthwhle thngs s 
mpossble. 
Before contnung, I should stress that Theogns’s remarks are compatble wth 
treatng chancng on what one loves as the acme of a lfe devoted to takng great 
chances. The target of such a lfe would presumably be wnnng the best goods 
Plato and Arstotle. Marble panel, Italy. 
Duomo Works Museum, Florence
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through takng great chances.2 Certanly he does not seem to be merely sayng that 
there s a thrll from gettng the best goods qute unexpectedly. Arstotle puts ths 
asde ths wthout argument when he treats the ratonal lfe focussed on a target as 
one n whch the target could not be what may be attaned only through very rsky 
choces. In partal defence of Arstotle, t mght be sad that the goal of attanng good 
thngs n lfe through takng great chances s so ll defined and would nvolve so lttle 
detaled control over what happens that t can hardly be sad to drect one’s behavour 
n any full blooded sense. 
For Theogns understood n the way I suggest, human lfe almost nvarably n-
cludes tragc loss because we are caught n two mportant dlemmas. The first s that 
we have to choose between a lfe devoted to payng lttle attenton to moralty but 
actng n our nterests, and a lfe devoted to beng morally upstandng but damagng 
our nterests. The second s that we have to choose between a lfe devoted to carefully 
promotng our nterests or to moral monotony, and a chancy lfe. Arstotle argues 
that t s n our power not to suffer tragc loss. In ths paper, I wll focus on the second 
dlemma. However, to understand Arstotle’s argument I wll start by dscussng hs 
way of dssolvng the first dlemma. It s mportant to understand that the two dlem-
mas are connected. To devote oneself to a lfe of moral monotony (or to the careful 
promoton of one’s nterests) at the expense of the chancy lfe s apparently to mss out 
on an mportant good — the exctng pleasures that come when thngs turn out very 
well through takng great rsks. In solvng the dlemmas posed by Theogns, Arstotle 
wll have to show that we can lve a most exctng and morally uprght lfe n whch we 
stll satsfy our deepest nterests. 
Aristotle’s solution 
Arstotle argues that t wll promote my good to be ethcal va argung that a human 
who wants to acheve eudamona wll carry out vrtuous actons prmarly for the 
sake of the fine (tou kalou eneka) (NE 1122b:6–7). He also wants to say that the 
vrtuous actvty s undertaken for the sake of tself, so I understand hm to be say-
ng that vrtuous actvty s a logcal or consttutve part of the fine (kalon) n ethcs. 
The fine s not separate from vrtuous actvty. There has been a long debate on what 
Arstotle means by the “kalon” n ethcs. As far as I can tell, those who argue that he 
s usng the term n a way that s n part aesthetc have won (Cooper, 1999:270–276; 
Rogers, 1993; Rchardson-Lear, 2004:126–146). Arstotle s argung that n a fully 
vrtuous person, there s great beauty n the fact that actons are made approprate 
to ther objects. For nstance, n explanng the sense n whch vrtue s a mean, he 
explans that “anyone can become angry or spend money, but to gve money to the 
2 “Tuchen” means somethng lke “chance on” or “luck on”, whch s why Rackham translates the crucal 
phrase as “...to wn one’s desre s pleasantest” (Arstotle, 1952:199). Woods’ readng, whch seems to 
mss the pont that chance s crucal, s “...most pleasant s to acheve one’s heart’s desre” (Arstotle, 
1992:1).
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rght person n the rght amount at the rght tme n the rght way for the sake of the 
rght end s not somethng of whch everyone s capable and s dfficult. Indeed, t s 
rare, praseworthy and fine” (NE 1109a:27–30). In Topcs, Arstotle explctly dent-
fies the fine wth the approprate or fittng (prepon) (135a:13–14). In NE the mag-
nficent man whom he greatly admres has the vrtue of megaloprepa — he explans 
that the term comes from “megath prepousa” (great fittngness — fittng expend-
ture on a grand scale) (1122a:22–26). 
A vrtuous lfe s a lfe n whch a whole person has made hmself nto a knd of 
work of art whch responds n precsely the way whch s correct. A crucal part of ts 
appeal s that havng acqured practcal wsdom (sophrosune), somethng whch s 
far harder to acqure than any Olympc skll (whch s only demandng n a one-sded 
manner), we now responds effortlessly and wth great enjoyment to many lfe-stua-
tons. We egostcally take great pleasure n our fine actvty, beng justfiably proud 
of what we have made of ourselves. However, I thnk Gabrelle Rchardson-Lear s 
also rght to emphasse that t s not approprate response to the object whch s cru-
cal to Arstotle, but what s approprate for the actng subject. It s crucal for Ars-
totle that fully vrtuous behavour s n some sense a completon of human nature. 
Vrtuous actvty s a human beng attanng hs natural end (telos) as human. The 
aesthetc pleasure vrtuous people take n ther actvty s part of a broader percep-
ton that they are n some sense attanng ther human end. Ths makes clearer why 
Arstotle thnks t s n my nterest to be vrtuous — n actng vrtuously, I am not 
merely makng myself as a knd of work of art of whch I can be proud. I am also 
aware that I am realsng my central end as a human beng. What s mportant, how-
ever, s not only that I am realsng my central end merely by beng vrtuous, t s also 
that I am showng that I am worthy of the goods I have by usng them. When I use 
them approprately I attan beng worthy (axos), a knd of self respect — the way 
Arstotle talks makes t clear that he s commtted to the vew that a knd of retro-
spectve desert casts a bengn lght over my whole lfe.3 Presumably he means to say 
that I could not get the crucal good of worthness or self-respect (axotta) f I got 
these goods wthout then usng them n a worthy way. 
Ths sketch shows us how Arstotle wants to solve the first dlemma. We get a 
glmmerng of how he wants to solve the second dlemma n a passage n whch he 
clarfies the sense n whch he thnks t s correct to be a self lover whle also lovng 
your frends for themselves. In the surroundng dscusson, he says that the many 
thnk that t s obvous that t s good to be a self lover. However, he argues that 
the many understand ths n the wrong way — presumably the many wrongly thnk 
that a career of dubous vce s ratonal. He then says that: 
It s also true of the excellent man (spoudaou) that he wll do many acts for hs frends 
and for hs fatherland, and f necessary de for them. For he wll gve up wealth and 
3 As Kelly Rogers ponts out, Arstotle seems to want to say that my fne acts transform the natural 
goods nto expressons of my fne character — the natural goods then become part of my fneness 
(Rogers, 1993:348). 
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honour and all the goods for whch men struggle, procurng for hmself the fine; because 
he would prefer a short tme of ntense pleasure (hesthena sfodra) to a long stress free 
perod (poln herema), a fine year of lfe to many years of happenstance (pollu et tuchon-
tos), and one great and fine acton to many small actons.4 Perhaps ths s what happens 
wth those who de for others — n ths way they choose great fineness (mega kalon) for 
themselves. Also they wll gve up wealth so that ther frends get more. For hs frends 
become wealther but he gets to be fine — he retans the greater good. And he behaves n 
the same way regardng offices and honours. For he wll gve up all these for hs frend. 
For ths s fine and praseworthy. He s properly beleved to be excellent, for he wll always 
prefer to choose the fine. He wll even accept that fine acts should be performed by hs 
frend, and t s finer (kallon) for hm to be the cause of hs frend brngng about fine 
acts. In sum, n all worthy conduct t s manfest that the excellent man takes more of the 
fine for hmself (1169a:18–27). 
So the clam s that the lfe of the excellent man ncludes the most ntense and exctng 
pleasure where t s ted to approprate moral acton. For whle beng worthy of the 
natural goods he owns, n the rght crcumstances he wll gve up everythng others 
struggle over for the sake of the ultmate good of fineness. Hs great acton wll gve 
hm a bref and presumably exctng perod of ntense pleasure whch s a deep enjoy-
ment at completng a fine lfe. 
Discussion of Aristotle’s View 
Arstotle’s attempt to deal wth Theogns’s problem shows consderable nsght nto 
the problems rased by the apparently monotonous nature of moral demands. Never-
theless, I thnk t suffers from serous problems. 
Theogns says that chancng on the mportant good of erotc love has a value that 
nothng else has. There s a thrll about gettng erotc love n ths way that makes t 
the most pleasant thng we can get. The pont can easly be expanded beyond erotc 
love, even f erotc love may be a paradgm case. There s a thrll about beng n stu-
atons n whch we are unsure what wll happen next because we have taken a punt, 
partcularly when they are fraught wth varous dangers. If thngs turn out well by 
chance, we feel a great sense of exhlaraton, somethng whch s not replacable by the 
enjoyable sense of control and worthness we get from fine moral acton. The good 
Theogns s descrbng, f ndeed t s a good, seems to be by ts nature a good that can-
not be attaned through plannng. A lfe devoted to such goods would be left as open 
as possble. We would shun commtments as they would not allow us an openness to 
happenstance that we would thnk lfe requred.5 
4 Note that the word I have translated as happenstance, “tuchontos” s derved from “tuche”. Arstotle’s 
clam seems to be that the spoudaos wll prefer to lose many years of unmerted and unfocussed lfe 
to a short lfe guded by hs target of attanng great fneness.
5 Of course, there s a problem about how we ndvduate goods whch cannot be dscussed n detal 
here — roughly, f goods are ndvduated n part by the knd of atttudes we have or by the ntentonal 
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Despte the fact that Theogns s makng an mportant pont, we need to consder 
Arstotle’s reasons for hs poston before concludng that Arstotle s wrong. Arstotle 
thnks that what people want s to be worthy of the goods they have — a knd of self 
respect s central to a good lfe. Ths self respect can only be acqured through our 
effort. Ths s crucal to hs argument for a lfe devoted to the central end of moral 
vrtue, as he thnks what makes the enormously dfficult task of leadng a vrtuous 
lfe worthwhle s that we gan the great good of self respect. So Arstotle would argue 
aganst them by sayng that we cannot get ths central good through a lfe devoted 
to the goods we can attan through chance. Arstotle also takes t that we need to 
justfy our lfe as a whole. If much of our lfe s not justfied t s wasted. If he s rght 
about ths but central goods come wthout beng n any sense deserved t s hard to 
see what the pont s of much of our lves (EE 1215b:19–1216a:27 shows that one of 
Arstotle’s mportant concerns s what makes lfe worth lvng). 
Nevertheless I thnk ths s an nadequate reply to Theogns. For whle self re-
spect mght be an mportant good, t s stll true that f Theogns s rght the vrtuous 
lfe nvolves an mportant loss. Indeed, Theogns can be taken to be mplctly al-
ready concedng at the outset that the lfe devoted to vrtue s finest because t gves 
us the mportant good of self respect and makes our whole lfe worthy and hence 
worthwhle. He could even concede that the good of self respect s more mportant 
than the thrll of chancng on love, and stll argue that a lfe lackng ths thrll s 
not eudamon. (In any case, snce the two goods are so dfferent, t s hard to see 
how there can be any justficaton for judgng one good superor to the other.) 
For Arstotle to reply adequately to Theogns he needs to show that the good 
so przed by Theogns s not really an mportant good. It only appears to be such 
because we have a dstorted understandng of ourselves or of the good n queston. 
Perhaps ths s really what he wants to do n clamng that the lfe of vrtue can be 
thrllng. Perhaps the real pont s that Theogns’s (and our) judgements are clouded 
by a false romantcsm. Perhaps what s really good for us s what uses and develops 
our characterstc powers as human bengs and we are deluded nto romantcsm 
because our lves are so filled by medocrty and boredom. However, to show ths 
Arstotle would need arguments whch are not present n hs works on ethcs. In 
any case, yearnng for happenstance seems to be just as characterstcally human as 
yearnng for what s attanable through drected acton. Perhaps the real problem 
objects nvolved n our justfied desres, then goods drected at one knd of ntentonal object are fun-
damentally dfferent from goods drected towards another knd. For nstance, the thrll of chancng 
on erotc love s not at all the same knd of good as the thrll of dong morally fine acts. On the other 
hand, f the strength of our satsfied desres for them s crucal to makng goods good, then all goods 
really form a sngle knd. In much of hs wrtng, Arstotle seems to assume that goods are ndvdu-
ated n part by our propostonal atttudes or by the nature of the objects that are good. However, n 
hs rebuttal of Theogns, he talks as f goods can be easly compared to one another. For nstance, n EE 
he says that eudamona s the finest and most pleasant and n NE he stresses how ncredbly pleasant 
a great and fine act can be (presumably by comparson to other pleasng thngs).
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s that we value ncompatble thngs — we value self-respect and what we attan 
through effort, but we also value the thrll of attanng wonderful thngs through 
takng chances. If so, eudamona s mpossble, as Theogns thought.
Bibliography
Arstotle, 1934
 Arstotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Wth an Englsh translaton by H. Rackham. Loeb Classcal 
Lbrary. London: Harvard Unversty Press.
Arstotle, 1952
 Arstotle, Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and Vices. Wth an Englsh trans-
laton by H. Rackham. Loeb Classcal Lbrary. London: Harvard Unversty Press.
Arstotle, 1992
 Arstotle, Eudemian Ethics. Translated Mchael Woods. Second Edton. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press.
Cooper, 1999
 John Cooper, Reason and Emotion. Prnceton: Prnceton Unversty Press.
Rchardson Lear, 2004
 Gabrel Rchardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good. Prnceton: Prnceton Unversty 
Press.
Rogers, 1993
 Kelly Rogers, “Arstotle Concepton of To Kalon”, Ancient Philosophy 13:355–71.
Russell, 2005
 Danel Russell, Plato on Pleasure and the Good Life. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Couvalis, George. 2009. Aristotle vs Theognis. In E. Close, G. Couvalis, G. Frazis, M. Palaktsoglou, and M. Tsianikas (eds.) "Greek 
Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2007", Flinders 
University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 81-88.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
